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The more I study, the more I find no sharp dichotomy between Eastern and Western basic legal theory. Eastern thought is no more supersensory or less reasoning than Western thought. In law, as in religion and matters philosophical, the reply of Dr. Nitobe to Kipling's famous "The East is the East and the West is the West," is more accurate:
"The East is in the West and the West is in the East;
There are no points of compass in the human soul."5
Elsewhere it has been suggested that world jurisprudence might properly ground itself on basic elements common to all great religions and cultures.6 This still allows for differences in specific laws just as there are differences within the Anglo-American system, for example, as to the rule against perpetuities.7
(2) Early Development of Legal Institutions. In this paper, Indian legal thought is briefly considered to show that much the same jurisprudential development, schools of jurisprudence, and theories of law occur as in our traditional Western pattern.
Sir Henry Maine in Ancient Law made comparison after comparison between the development of Hindu legal institutions and the development of legal systems of Europe. In fact, he was able to point out from his study certain characteristics of primitive legal systems and certain fundamental stages in their early growth: the prevalence of co-ownership and the intermixture of personal and proprietary rights; the confusion of public and private duties; the importance of the family; the theory is a part of the "East" or "West", and where China and India fit into the classification. These writers have tended to rule the communist world out of their systems and to seek a world law for half-a-world. Northrop 6 "The United Nations Organization and International Law," 31 Corn. L. Q. 259. 7 I would be the first to admit the value of the taking of differences. The whole technique of the lawyer is based on recognizing differences-millions of them. What I hope we avoid in comparative law is the mistake comparative religion made, and has not yet rectified, of emphasizing differences to prove that one's own system was summa cum. Thus Western religion emphasized its belief in a Supreme Being compared to a pervading presence revealed in many avataras, a man centered compared to a cosmic universe, condemnation of idolatry compared to image worship, original sin and salvation compared to Karma, immortality compared to reincarnation, a religion of material well being compared to asceticism. I venture to suggest that actually all religions have had (and have) in them each of the elements mentioned and that comparative religion is only now discovering its oneness. See note 5 supra and E. A. Burtt, Man Seeks the Divine (New York, 1957). continuous tutelage of women; the growth of the law through fiction.8 His historical jurisprudence is grounded in Hinduism.
In the early development stages of all legal systems there is no clear distinction between legal rules and religious commands. The story of the Hindu Code of Manu and Moses' Ten Commandments is strikingly similar.9 Manu's life is a combination of Noah, Jonah, and Moses. The avowed assumption of the old textbooks of Hindu law is that the law is eternal. The primary source of the law is the scriptures-the Vedas.'0 In keeping with the religious view of law, the second source of law is the teaching of the religious leaders and, after that, conscience." There was no clear distinction between legal duties and moral duties. Law embraced all of life and was synonymous with virtue. The Hindu word for law-"dharma"-shows this derivation.'2
The same relationship can be illustrated by the development of legal literature. The oldest sources of Hindu law are the Vedic hymns based on social custom and divine inspiration. The Aranyakas and Upanishads contain some law, but mainly philosophy and ritual. The Sravta and Grihya Sutras come next and do spell out Aryan custom and rules relating to the social organization. The final stage in the evolution toward ancient Hindu law is the Dharmasuitras, which come near to being lawyer's law. They prescribe detailed rules governing all four stages of life, though chiefly that of Garhasthya or householder. The Dharma Sastras, or Legal Institutes of the Hindus, actually cover civil and criminal law (in Vyavahara), but also social and religious observances (in Achara) and expiation for sin (in Prayaschitta). Smritis, of which eighteen are known, provided numerous commentaries on the Sastras-widely varied by geography, tradition, and culture (somewhat comparable to the glossators on the Roman Code). A practice (e.g., marriage with a maternal uncle's daughter) might be common practice in South India and condemned in the North, and both glossators would find support in the Sastras. In fact, writers from the earliest times up to and including the present debate on the Hindu Code Bill have always sought support of the Sastric norms to justify and approve, or to oppose and challenge practices or proposals of the society in which 8 Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (Everyman ed.) 156; "The ancient German law, like Hindu jurisprudence, makes the male children co-proprietors with their father, and the endowment of the family cannot be parted with except by the consent of all its members," p. 116; widow frequently becomes ward of sons, p. 90; adoption used to expand family into community, p. 16 and ch. 5. they live. One of the real strengths of Hindu law has been its reliance on ancient law (religion) while changing it to meet social demands.'3 I shall leave further illustrations of ancient Hindu law and its transition to sections (4) and (5) of this article.
(3) "Schools of Jurisprudence" in Ancient India. If you recall that in Anglo-American jurisprudence the earliest legal writings did not differentiate schools and that our scholastic jurisprudence took shape only in the nineteenth century and became recognizable as "schools" in the prolific writing of Dean Pound in the twentieth, and that the chief exponents of some of our schools appeared only within the last forty years (realist, pure theory), you will understand my conclusion that there were no "schools" of jurisprudence in ancient India. Many writers on Indian legal theory have pointed out that the ancient writers would have been surprised to be told that they belonged to a particular "cschool,"'4-just as, I suppose, Cicero did not know he was a "natural law" man. Yet these same writers have illustrated the degree to which one can find, in the earliest Hindu writings, matter which presents the natural law, historical, philosophic, analytical (and every other) school of legal thought.'5 But, we ought not to labor a point which should be fairly obvious. Perhaps a quotation from one of India's great modern legal scholars will suffice. If the king were not without indolence to punish the guilty, the stronger would roast the weaker like fish on a spit." "The whole race of men is kept in order by punishment; for a guiltless man is hard to find; through fear of punishment this universe is able to enjoy its blessings." a "right" is a protected interest, that procedure is at the very heart of substance, and that the more highly developed the procedure the more complete is the jurisprudential system. In India, so complete are the records, we can almost place the exact time at which a thorough procedural system comes into being. Apasthamba, Gautama, Vasistha, and Visnu contain few procedural rules (though they develop some rules of evidence); they are still speaking of ordeals and compurgation, (there is slight reference to witnesses).36 Manu developed an extensive code of evidence but otherwise little procedure.37 With Jajnavalkya and Narada, the law of procedure becomes complete. Thus in Yajnavalkya we find procedure classified under Plaint, Answer, Proof and Decision.38 The detail of rules can be seen from the following:
(1) No recrimination or counterclaim is allowed until the complaint is discharged;
(2) No departure from pleading is permissible. (3) Counterclaim or recrimination is permitted in certain criminal charges.
(4) Each party is required to find a surety for satisfaction of judgment.
(5) Where a contesting defendant loses, he pays an amount equal to the claim to the king; while, where the complaint is found to be false the complainant pays double the amount to the king.
(6) Distinction between cases which have to be tried immediately and those where decision is to be adjourned. Evidence is particularly well and early developed. As early as Gautama, the rules are detailed.42 From Visnu on, we find classification into real evidence, witnesses, and presumptions. The rules refer to best and secondary evidence, qualification of witnesses, order of proof, crossexamination, burden of proof, res ipsa loquitur, hearsay, perjury, demeanor.43 The point need not be labored further.
( "Through the centuries, the one supreme guiding principle of the Hindu system was that the conduct of the authority, as of the subject, must conform to law or 'Dharma.' 'Dharma,' a word difficult to translate into English, includes the concepts of justice, law, right and duty, and acting according to Dharma means the duty of acting in a way, in the sphere of one's activity, that would best lead the individual to his self-realization-Moksha or Nirwana." . . "In shaping the development of the rule of law in our system, the traditions of the English system, acquired during the British rule, the influence of the American Constitutional system, with its 'due process,' our own ancient traditions and the concluded by reference to two positions of the Indian courts and parliament in the critical years, 1950-53. First, although the Supreme Court refused to accept natural justice as a definition of "law,"46 it has set aside a decision of a labor tribunal, which failed to allow the parties to produce evidence, as contrary to the rule of law;47 it issued certiorari to determine whether a tribunal acted contrary to48 and in other cases followed the established principles of natural justice.49 Second, the courts in 1950-51 held certain provisions of the land reform acts, adopted under constitutional authority, invalid as not providing proper compensation.50 Although there was wide criticism in India of the decisions, which held up the much needed land reform program, and many lawyers and political figures believed the decisions thwarted the purposes of the constitution, the country showed its respect for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary by amending the constitution to remove any ambiguity which the Court had found in the original constitution.51 (5) Modern Hindu Jurisprudence; The Great Synthesis. We have already objected to the tendency to refer to Asian jurisprudence as though we were discussing the year 500 B.C., which assumes that if Confucius says "X" or the Dharma Sastras contain "Y" or Buddhism teaches "Z," then these must characterize the legal philosophies of modern countries. We have even attempted to show that, properly understood, ancient Hindu jurisprudence is not "ideologically different" from our own. But, it is insisted that, important as antecedents may be, nothing could be wider of the truth than that we should ground our discussion solely in ancient history. We are concerned with modern law, and modern law is the product of growth and synthesis. Nowhere is this more true than in India.
So much has been written of the English influence on Indian law that it is necessary to do little more than recall its major outline. In the footnotes there is somewhat more extensive consideration of certain fields of law on which American articles are not likely to appear for some time. With British rule in India, English public law, criminal law, law of torts, and procedure were imported wholesale.52 English influence extended even into Hindu law of family, property, and inheritance, though the Acts declared that Hindu or Mohammedan law was to be applied in these areas. "The law is the calling of thinkers and jurisprudence, not a mere survey either of cases or of individual decisions determining particular rights. One learns from law an amiable latitude with regard to psychology, beliefs and tastes and acquires that catholic outlook whereby men may be pardoned for the defects of their quality if they have quality in their defects. To be able to see so far as one may and to discern the great forces that are behind every detail makes all the difference between philosophy and disputation and between legal compilation and jurisprudence.... "Excessive preoccupation with the purpose of law (Bentham's 'utilitarianism,' Pound's 'social engineering,' and Jhering's 'means to an end' are referred to), unrelated to the source from where it originates has caused much unnecessary mystification about 'executive legislation,' 'New despotism' and 'Administrative Law.'... "It appears that the future jurisprudence will have for its major concern the functional view of the law which alone can reconcile the demands for change with the demands for security." and the Law," Radhaknal Mukerjee gives a penetrating analysis of law and modern psychology58 and in other articles59 it is advocated that the bar receive training in psychology. A glance at any current Hindu law journal will reveal that the articles tend to be more jurisprudential than our own.
Elsewhere, it has been pointed out how India has borrowed from the world in framing its constitution.60 It has drawn on the common law of England and the civil liberties cases of the United States. Some say that it has taken the concept of preventive detention from Russia. I might digress a moment to show how complete has been the synthesis on preventive detention. The oldest existing statute of which I know is the Bengal Regulation of 1818, though some date its Indian antecedents to 1795. Numerous Provincial Maintenance of Public Order Acts existed in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the British Defence of the Realm and Defence of India Acts (under which Ghandi was imprisoned) were continued and finally embodied in the 1950 Preventive Detention Act (to meet partition's problems). Local, Russian, British law have all contributed.6' Though India is evolving many original rules of her own, it need not be assumed that her appetite for imported legal principles is exhausted. She will doubtless pick and choose among the systems with which her citizens become acquainted. India has always shown a tolerance and hospitality for other cultures, even those forced upon her. Hardly a writer facing Indian jurisprudence but remarks on this.62 A Suggested Approach. Perhaps the essence of my approach can now be stated. It is to recognize that we are concerned with modern law, even when we review ancient law for comparison; that modern law in all countries is a synthesis of old and new, Western and Eastern; that for adequate study we divide law into subjects, some of which are deeply rooted in old traditions and culture and some of which are related to, but largely replace, those traditions; that we should clearly distinguish the area studied and the approach needed; that we recognize that in areas like "family law" which are closest to custom, the variations between two states in America or two sections in India may be as great as the dissimilarities between East and West; that in many areas no one can tell from what law a given quotation comes. I venture to say that there is no Eastern or Western philosophy and no Eastern or Western law.
